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brain function to explain depressed mood and its clinical manifestations. The EST in 23 question rests on two uncontroversial assumptions. The first appeals to a consensus 24 among cognitive scientists that the brain is a hierarchical, self-organising system 25 sculpted by evolution [3] [4] [5] . This hierarchy ranges from lower-order, highly 26 specialised neural subsystems responsible for sensory-motor processing; through to 27 highly integrated cortical regions that develop more gradually and underlie the 28 sophisticated, executive cognitive faculties unique to humans [see Box 1] . This calls 29 for a theory of global brain function that explains how depression emerges from 30 coordinated interactions within hierarchically integrated neuronal systems. The 31 second assumption echoes dynamic systems approaches that situate the brain within 32 the evolutionary dynamics of the brain-body-environment system [6] [7] [8] . According to 33 this view, the neural mechanisms responsible for depression can only be understood 34 by considering the broader context of human evolution, enculturation, development, 35 embodiment and behaviour. 36
37
We aim to exemplify this approach by offering an interdisciplinary hypothesis of the 38 depressed brain. Following the free-energy principle (FEP; see [5] ), we first discuss 39 how depressive disorders emerge from the functioning of, and disruptions to, 40 hierarchical neural dynamics that seek to minimise uncertainty. We then integrate this 41 work with psychological research on the adaptive function of depression, along with 42 the familial, developmental and psychobiological mechanisms that often underlie it. 43
We propose that our species-typical capacity for depressed mood can be explained as 44
an evolved biobehavioural strategy that responds adaptively to adverse interpersonal 45 conditions by minimising the likelihood of unpredictable social interactions. We 46 discuss how our model builds on theories of clinical depression in the active inference 47 literature, before turning to the hierarchical neural mechanics that underlie depressed 48 mood and depressive disorder. 49 50
Applying the Free-Energy Principle to Depression 51
The FEP is a global theory of neural structure and function suggesting the brain can 52 be seen as a "prediction machine" that attempts to maximise the evidence for a 53 creature's model of the world by minimising an upper limit on surprise [i.e., free-54 energy; see Box 2]. In line with predictive coding, the FEP describes the brain as a 55
hierarchical generative modela hierarchy of hypotheses about the world that 56 enables a reduction of surprise by minimising discrepancies between incoming 57 sensory inputs and top-down predictions [9] . Conditional expectations are thought to 58 be encoded by deep pyramidal cells (i.e., representation units) at each level of the 59 cortical hierarchy that convey predictions downward to suppress errors at the level 60 below, while prediction errors are encoded by superficial pyramidal cells (i.e., error 61 units) that convey errors forward to revise expectations at the level above [10] . This 62 allows us to minimise surprise by updating our internal models (i.e., perception). 63
Alternatively, we can selectively sample sensory data to ensure that our predictions 64 are self-fulfillingby changing how we act upon the world to confirm our 65 expectations (i.e., active inference [11] ). Thus, perception and action operate 66 synergistically to minimise prediction errors and optimise our internal representations 67 of the environment. A key corollary of this model is that our predictions are optimised 68 by evolution, development and learning. Emphasis is placed on adaptive priors -69 inherited expectations about the way our world unfolds that have been shaped by 70 natural selection to guide action-perception cycles toward adaptive (i.e., unsurprising) 71 states [5, 12] . 72
73
To date, applications of the FEP to depressive disorders have chiefly concentrated on 74 two processes, stemming from different levels of the cortical hierarchy. The first 75 relates to limbic deficits in minimising prediction error. Barrett and colleagues 76 suggest that depressive disorders arise from aberrant interoceptive predictions 77 originating from abnormalities within the (limbic) agranular visceromotor cortex, 78 which is central to emotional processing, energy regulation and allostatic responses to 79 stress [13, 14] . These abnormalities can arise from past exposure to sustained distress, 80 and generate false (interoceptive) predictions about the body's upcoming autonomic, 81 metabolic and immunological needs that chronically activate physiological stress 82 responses (e.g., dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and 83 pro-inflammatory states). Over time, the visceromotor systems try to minimise 84 prediction error by producing sickness behaviours (e.g., negative affect and fatigue; 85 also see [15] ) that reduce energy expenditure and ultimately manifest in depression 86
[13]. Here, depression is seen as a disorder of allostasis, characterised by energy 87 dysregulation and deficits in interoceptive inference; i.e., an insensitivity to prediction 88 errors and/or a miscalibration of their precisionsee glossary [14] . These deficits 89 lead to a failure to update dysfunctional internal models (e.g., cognitive rigidity), 90 perpetuating further metabolic inefficiencies and engendering the downward spiral 91 that typifies depressive illness. 92
93
The second class of models concentrates on impairments in top-down expectations of 94 reward. Checkroud [16] has described the depressed brain as a hierarchical 95 constellation of depressive beliefs, which impose a consistent negative bias in 96 predictions that manifests in anhedonic features and the down-regulation of neural 97 reward systems (e.g., dopaminergic and serotonergic dysfunction). In line with active 98 inference, these beliefs exacerbate depression by prompting the individual to actively 99 sample the environment to confirm negative predictions (e.g., learned helplessness). 100
Others have suggested that depressive disorders impair reward-approach behaviours 101 by causing a pathological underconfidence in one's predictions [17] , or by distorting 102 higher-order evaluations of the self (e.g., low self-worth), disrupting social behaviour 103 by overweighting the likelihood of aversive interactions [18] . Each of these proposals 104 echo models of reinforcement learning in computational psychiatry and evolutionary 105 biology suggesting that depression emerges from successive discrepancies between 106 actual and expected reward outcomes (i.e., prediction errors), entrenching (empirical) 107 prior beliefs that rewards are unlikely which inhibit reward-approach behaviours [19, 108 20]. 109 110 Taken together, the frameworks considered here suggest that depression entails 111 impairments in reward-approach systems emerging from two neurocognitive 112 processesdeficits in the predictive processing of sensory evidence; and prior beliefs 113 that negatively bias predictions. Although this perspective of depression as false 114 inference offers a cohesive, neurobiologically plausible account of the biobehavioural 115 deficits observed in depressive illness, two important questions remain. First, by 116 concentrating on depressive disorders, the models above say little about our species-117 typical capacity for depressed or low mood. The notable exception is a formal 118 (computational) scheme that defines emotional valence in terms of the rate of change 119 in free-energy over time, with positive and negative affect tracking a decrease and 120 increase in free-energy, respectively (see [17] ). In this model, negative moods enable 121 an organism to respond adaptively to unexpected changes in the world by increasing 
Insights from an Evolutionary Systems Approach to Psychology 136
In psychology, evolutionary systems models have typically focused on the dynamic 137 interplay between evolutionary and developmental processes (e.g., [8, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] ), an 138 approach that has been further extended to reconcile theoretical divisions between 139 major paradigms in the field (see [4] ). According to this perspective, the embodied 140 brain and behaviour emerge from selection acting on dynamic interactions between 141 the levels of causation identified by Tinbergenadaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, 142 and mechanism [26]. This causal hierarchy is arguably recapitulated by paradigms in 143 psychology, which concentrate differentially on four overlapping levels of 144 explanationultimate hypotheses for adaptive, species-typical characteristics (i.e., 145 evolutionary psychology); epigenetic explanations for intergenerational, between-146 group differences (i.e., evolutionary developmental biology and psychology); 147 dynamical explanations for individual similarities and differences (i.e., developmental 148 psychology); and mechanistic explanations for real-time phenomena (i.e., 149 psychological subdisciplines such as cognitive, biological, personality, social and 150 clinical psychology) [4] . Central to EST is the need to explore how these causal levels 151
interactevolutionary influences on neural structure and function constrain 152 individual development and learning, while effects at these more proximate levels can 153 shape the evolution of the brain [3, 27] . To explain depression then, we require a 154 multi-level hypothesis that synthesises diverse fields of psychological inquiry to 155 explain both why it is adaptive, along with how it emerges from intergenerational, 156 developmental and real-time mechanisms. 157
158
Although there are various Darwinian models of depression [28], a theme common to 159 many of these is that low mood reflects an adaptive biobehavioural strategy that 160 conserves or reallocates energy and resources in unpropitious social environments [29, 161 30 ]. According to this view, depressed mood states are elicited by aversive 162 interpersonal outcomes (e.g., exclusion, defeat, or loss) that indicate a critical loss of 163 control over social relationships that were critical to ancestral fitness [31] . A model 164 that incorporates influential theories in this area and shows promising conceptual 165 parallels with the FEP is the social risk hypothesis (technically, risk corresponds to 166 uncertainty and uncertainty is expected surprise or free energy). This maintains that 167 depressed mood reflects an adaptive, risk-averse approach to social interaction that 168 reduces the likelihood of further aversive outcomes by: (1) increasing our cognitive 169 sensitivity to (sensory) cues of social risk; (2) reducing our (behavioural) propensity 170 for taking social risks; and (3) initiating signalling behaviours that elicit support and 171 defuse conflict [32] . 172
173
The idea that depression reflects an evolved response to adverse social conditions 174 concords with evidence that extends across Tinbergen's remaining levels of inquiry. 175
The intergenerational transmission of susceptibility to depressive disorders due to 176 deleterious social environments is widely documented [33, 34] , with studies involving 177 rodents, primates, and humans showing that exposure to social stressors (e.g., low 178 maternal care and social defeat) produces potentially heritable epigenetic changes that 179 confer risk for disorder by heightening stress reactivity [35, 36] . Ontogenetically, 180 exposure to early social stress (e.g., parental loss, abuse, or neglect) is a strong 181 predictor of depressive vulnerability [37], and is thought to heighten susceptibility to 182 disorder by leading to hyperactivity of the HPA axis [38, 39] and up-regulating pro-183 inflammatory immune responses [40] . Behavioural and neuroimaging studies further 184 suggest that the risk of depressive onset rises markedly in adolescence because of an 185 increased sensitivity to social threats in this period [41, 42] . Finally, research across 186 the sub-disciplines highlights an intimate connection between depression and the 187 social world (see [43] ). For example, the precipitants of depression are typically 188 interpersonal in nature [44] ; social support and belonging are key protective factors 189
[45]; and typical correlates of depression clearly exemplify negative self-other 190 relations (e.g., low self-esteem [46] In light of such work, we suggest that the human capacity for depressed mood can be 207 explained in terms of a risk-averse adaptive prior that minimises uncertainty in the 208 social world when sensory cues indicate both a high degree of socio-environmental 209 volatility (i.e., unpredictability) and an increased probability of aversive interpersonal 210 outcomes (e.g., rejection, defeat or loss) (see Figure 1 ). This depressive response 211 instantiates a "better safe than sorry" strategy that minimises the likelihood of Neurodevelopmental changes in these regions throughout adolescence are also 263 thought to heighten vulnerability to disorder by increasing sensitivity to rapidly 264 changing social contexts in this period (see Box 4). Collectively, such findings fit well 265 with our proposal that depression often stems from the need to adapt to complex 266 social contexts, and manifests through the bidirectional interplay of hierarchical 267 neuronal processes. 268
269
Specifically, we speculate that the extended visceromotor system responds to 270 volatility in the social environment by increasing the precision of social prediction Ultimately, our basic claim is that depression can be viewed as an adaptive faculty 290 that underwrites emotional allostasis in an increasingly prosocial and volatile world. 291
Physiologically, this faculty increases sensitivity to interpersonal, affiliative and 292 interoceptive cues. Clearly, sensitisation to stressful exteroceptive and interoceptive 293 cues also has to be predicted by the hierarchical brain, which implicates the functional 294 Crucially, in order to act it is also necessary to attenuate the precision afforded to the 298 sensory consequences of action (i.e., we have to ignore the fact that we are not 299 currently acting). This means that an adaptive depressive response suspends sensory 300 attenuationand actionso that we can attend to interpersonal prediction errors and 301 revise our (posterior) beliefs about our relationships with others, via perceptual 302 inference and learning. Sensory attenuation can be regarded as the complement of 303 sensory attention; i.e., attenuating or augmenting the gain (precision) afforded sensory 304 prediction errors to ignore or select sensory information, respectively. According to 305 this scheme, maladaptive forms of depression reflect a pervasive, self-maintaining 306 failure of sensory attenuation, leading to ruminations, false inference and a 307 concomitant inability to act and test these false beliefs. 308 309 Interestingly, exactly the same conclusions (namely, a failure of sensory attenuation) 310 have been drawn for a range of neuropsychiatric disorders, ranging from autism [64] 311 to schizophrenia [65]. One could ask what is specific about this mechanism in 312 depression, and respond by referring to the particular (interoceptive and affiliative) 313 modalities affected. However, perhaps the more intriguing implication is that the 314 comorbidity of depression and other disorders might arise from a common 315 pathophysiological mechanism, which can be explained in terms of false inference. 316 317
Concluding Remarks 318
In this opinion piece, we have endeavoured to contribute to the active inference 319 literature on mood disorder by suggesting that normative levels of depressed mood 320 instantiate an adaptive prior that minimises the likelihood of surprising interpersonal 321 interactions when faced with threats of aversive social outcomes that typically 322 compromised ancestral fitness. By extending beyond previous applications of the FEP 323 to emphasise both the adaptive function of low mood and the causal role of the social 324 ecology, we believe our model demonstrates the heuristic benefits of combining 325 active inference with insights in psychology to improve our understanding of 326 depressed mood and mood disorder. It also motivates new questions for research, 327 calling for greater integration between neuroscientific and psychological approaches 328 to explore the ways in which the neural mechanisms that underpin depression relate to 329 behaviour, development and the social world [see Outstanding Questions]. In 330 particular, the idea that depression can emerge from the need to navigate social risks 331 stands to inform theory-driven approaches in computational psychiatry, which 332 improve our understanding, prediction and treatment of mental illness by using 333 simulations and mathematical models to capture complex interactions across multiple 334 causal levels [19, 66] . 335
336
That said, we do not wish to imply that depression is solely attributable to social 337 causes. In evolutionary psychology, for instance, the distinction between social and 338 non-social depressive responses is widely recognised , 339 and as we have noted, depression can also arise from depressogenic neuroanatomical 340 abnormalities produced by influences other than unfavourable social conditions. 
Glossary 374
Active inference: A corollary of the free-energy principle, which states that we 375 minimise surprise (i.e., prediction errors) by changing our predictions (i.e., 376 perception) or by acting upon the world to elicit sensations that conform to 377 predictions (i.e., action). 378
Adaptive prior: A prior endowed by evolution to underwrite adaptive fitness. 379
Association cortex: Regions of the cerebral cortex that are not primary sensory or 380 motor projection areas, including the prefrontal cortex, and extensive parts of the 381 temporal, parietal and occipital cortices.. 382
Empirical priors: Priors found in hierarchical models that can be learned or inferred 383 under priors from the level above. 384
Entropy:
The uncertainty or average surprise associated with outcomes sampled from 385 a probability distribution. A distribution with low entropy means, on average, that the 386 outcome is relatively predictable. 387 Evolutionary systems theory: A multidisciplinary paradigm that explains dynamic, 388 evolving systems in terms of co-action between self-organisation and general 389 selection (e.g., natural selection) over time. This produces complex adaptive systems, 390 like the brain, that adapt to the environment through an autonomous process of 391 selection that recruits the outcomes of locally interacting components within that 392 system to select a subset of those components for replication or enhancement. 393
Free-energy principle:
A generalisation of predictive coding that asserts that 394 organisms actively minimise an upper bound on surprise (i.e., free energy), which, 395 under simplifying assumptions, translates to (precision weighted) prediction error. 396
Generative Model: A probabilistic mapping from hidden causes in the environment 397 to observed consequences (sensory data), typically specified in terms of the likelihood 398 of observing some data (given their causes) and priors (on these causes). In psychology, it has long been recognised that the brain entails a hierarchical 421 structure ranging from highly specialised sensorimotor systems at its lowest levels 422 through to developmentally flexible, highly integrated systems responsible for higher-423 order executive functions [3, 4] . A hierarchical neural architecture is also emphasised 424 by predictive coding approaches in neuroscience, which explore how the brain 425 minimises prediction error via recurrent message-passing between cortical levels [9, 426 68, 69]. More recently, imaging studies in network neuroscience have provided direct 427 evidence that the brain exhibits a multiscale hierarchical organisation, with a given 428 node (e.g., network, module or sub-module) itself comprising a network of smaller 429 interacting nodes at a lower level [68, 70] (see Figure I) . 430
431
Comparative work suggests that a hierarchical architecture is a hallmark of the 432 mammalian brain, progressing from highly segregated sensorimotor hierarchies 433 common to all mammals through to the cortical association areas that confer the 434 adaptive advantage of heightened cognitive control among primates [71, 72] . Again, 435 this structure is thought to exemplify the complementary relationship between 436 evolution and developmentselection has canalised early sensorimotor regions that 437 serve as neurodevelopmental anchors, allowing for the progressive, activity-438 dependent self-organisation of widely distributed association networks that lie furthest 439 from sensory patterning centres [71, 73] . This neuroplasticity enhances adaptability 440 by producing higher-order, "domain-general" faculties that are able to respond 441 flexibly to rapidly changing environments [6, 73] . 442
443
It is now broadly accepted that a hierarchical neural structure is favoured by selection. 444
It enhances evolvability because deleterious changes to a single component of the 445 system are unlikely to affect the system itself, and it allows adaptive novelties to 446 emerge without disrupting global functioning [70] . Computer simulations of evolving 447 networks have also shown that selection favours a hierarchical organisation because it 448 conserves the (spatial, processing and metabolic) cost of neural connections; improves 449 problem-solving by recursively combining solutions to sub-problems; and adapts 450 more rapidly to new environments than non-hierarchical structures [74] . Finally, the 451 hierarchical brain is thought to promote "self-organised criticality". This is a 452 dynamical state poised between completely ordered, stable cycles of activity and 453 highly complex, chaotic ones that optimises evolvability because it allows small 454 extrinsic changes to elicit large intrinsic reorganisations. The hierarchical segregation 455 of neural networks into distributed neighbourhoods has been found to stretch the 456 parameter range for self-organised criticality by allowing subcritical and supercritical 457 dynamics to co-exist simultaneously [75] . Since systems at criticality have optimal 458 information-processing capacities, a structure that extends this critical region is likely 459 to be naturally selected [76] . 460
BOX 2: The Free-Energy Principle 461
The FEP seeks to explain how biological systems maintain their integrity by 462 occupying a constricted number of states [5] . It suggests that all organisms actively 463 reduce the entropy (i.e. disorder or dispersion) of their sensory and physical states by 464 minimising free-energy. Borrowed from statistical thermodynamics and machine 465 learning, free-energy is an information theory quantity which limits (by being greater 466 than) the entropy of a brain's sensations or sensory samples from the environment. In The FEP appeals to predictive coding by characterising the brain as a hierarchical 482 inference machine that minimises prediction error by seeking to match incoming 483 sensory inputs with top-down predictions [see Figure II ]. This occurs in two ways. 484
First, we can improve our predictions by altering internal states (i.e., perception). 485
Second, we can act upon the world to confirm our predictions (i.e., action). Thus, 486 action and perception operate synergistically to optimise an organism's model of the 487 environment. Crucially, to minimise free-energy, the precision of prediction errors 488 also has to be predicted, invoking notions of attentional gain (psychologically) and 489 neuromodulation (physiologically). 490
491
The FEP also applies to the morphology, development and evolution of the brain. It 492 suggests that instead of just containing a model of the world, the brain is a model of 493 the worlda physical transcription of causal regularities in the environment that is 494 optimised by evolution. This model instantiates genetically specified (empirical) prior 495 beliefs that have minimised free-energy (i.e., maximised model evidence) over 496 evolutionary time by ensuring an organism seeks out a small number of unsurprising 497 states that are consistent with its phenotype and environment. In other words, natural 498 selection is nature's way of performing Bayesian model selection to minimise the 499 (variational) free energy of phenotypes (i.e., generative models). 500 501
Box 3: The Adaptive Significance of Depression 502

Box 4: The Adolescent Brain and Risk for Depression 503
The brain undergoes significant maturation in adolescence, involving processes that 504 begin with puberty and continue until a young person is in their mid-to-late twenties 505 [77] . Over this period, there is a progressive increase in white matter, alongside 506 synaptic pruning and grey matter loss, which have the effect of delineating more 507 clearly defined large-scale brain networks [78] . Subcortical regions, including the 508 primary components of the reward system, undergo more rapid maturation [79], while 509 the most prolonged development is in association cortex, including prefrontal regions 510 that are implicated in social processing [78, 80] . 511
512
It is now widely accepted that the functional and structural changes that accompany 513 adolescence reflect a particularly sensitive period for adapting to the social world. 514
Brain imaging studies show that adolescence is typified by significant alterations in 515 social and affective processing systems, which are thought to increase risk for mood 516 disorder by heightening sensitivity to social threats in this period [41, [80] [81] [82] . 517
Coincident with these neurodevelopmental processes, there are also substantial 518 changes in the adolescent social environment. Peer relationships become increasingly 519 important, hierarchical and complex, and there is significant socio-environmental 520 volatilityfriendships change frequently, and romantic relationships are typically 521 short-lived [83] . 522 523 It is unsurprising, then, that the period from adolescence to early adulthood is a peak 524 time for the onset of depression [42] . During adolescence, sources of social 525 uncertainty are frequently encountered. Maturation of subcortical regions, along with 526 marked hormonal changes [82, 84] , increase sensitivity to affective and self-relevant 527 social cues. Moreover, prefrontal cortical development leads, on the one hand, to 528 improved regulation of affective processes, but on the other, heightens sensitivity to 529 the nuance and complexity of interpersonal relationships [58] . For this reason, 530 increased vulnerability to depression starts in puberty but is maintained well beyond 531 adolescence. 532 533
